In 2004, a district court in New Jersey held that certain plaintiffs could not recover damages for defendants' alleged breaches of fiduciary duty because such recovery was really for individual participants rather than the plan. In re Schering-Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 2004 WL 1774760 at 6 (D.N.J. June 28, 2004). The Third Circuit has now reversed and remanded the case in a landmark decision which you can access here. The opinion written by Third Circuit Judge Alarcon states the issue and holding as follows:
We must decide in this matter whether, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), the District Court erred in ruling that former employees, who were participants in a defined contribution plan, may not prosecute a derivative action on behalf of an employees’ savings plan to recover losses sustained by the savings plan because of alleged breaches of fiduciary duty. We conclude that the Plaintiffs may seek money damages on behalf of the fund, notwithstanding the fact the alleged fiduciary violations affected only a subset of the saving plan’s participants.
The defendants in the case had sought to rely on the Milofsky case, but the court distinguished Milofsky from the case at hand:
In a letter to this Court filed pursuant to Rule 28(j) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Defendants cited a recent decision of the Fifth Circuit, Milofsky v. American Airlines, Inc., 404 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2005) reh’g en banc granted, No. 03-11087, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15122, (5th Cir. July 19, 2005) in support of their argument that a participant lacks standing to bring an action on behalf of an individual account pension plan if he or she does not seek plan-wide relief. . . The facts in Milofsky are clearly distinguishable from those in the matter sub judice. In Milofsky, the plaintiffs alleged that the value of their investments in the BEX plan decreased because of the failure of the defendants to transfer the funds to the American Eagle 401(k) plan. Id. at 351. Thus, this alleged loss occurred prior to the transfer of the BEX plan participants’ investments to the American Eagle 401(k) plan. In Milofsky, the plaintiffs sought damages on behalf of the BEX plan members, and did not seek to restore assets of the American Eagle 401(k) fund. Here, the Plaintiffs seek damages from the fiduciaries for their violation of their duty to a subclass which had transferred its funds to the trustee of the Savings Fund.
The DOL had filed an amicus brief in the case which you can access here. DOL had argued in the case that a breach of fiduciary duty did not need to harm the entire plan to give rise to liability under § 1109 and that holding so would have the effect of insulating fiduciaries who breach their duty so long as the breach did not harm all of a plan's participants. The DOL went on to note that "[s]uch a result clearly would contravene ERISA's imposition of a fiduciary duty that has been characterized as 'the highest known to law.'"
The DOL has issued this press release: "U.S. Secretary of Labor Elaine L. Chao Announces Settlements for Global Crossing Retirement Plans."
The LA Times reports: "Global Crossing Executives Settle Retirement Suit."
Also, the Wall Street Journal reports--"Labor Department Settles With Former Global Crossing Executives":
The Labor Department said Tuesday that Global Crossing founder and former Chairman Gary Winnick will pay $25 million from an irrevocable escrow account and former officers and directors, including Mr. Winnick, former Chief Executive Thomas Casey and former members of the employee benefits committee, will pay an additional $54 million from insurance policies, if the court approves the settlement."Fiduciaries have a significant responsibility to protect the long-term pension security of their workers," said Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao. "I hope this lesson gets through to others."
In March, Global Crossing had settled a related private lawsuit with shareholders, workers and employees for $325 million (read about it here) but, according to the Wall Street Journal report, a clause in the settlement allowed plaintiffs to back out of the agreement if the Department of Labor's investigation was not resolved to their satisfaction. Back in March, plaintiffs' lawyers were calling it "the first of [the] leviathan-sized cases to come to a successful close."
The Wall Street Journal is reporting: "Enron Employees to Settle Retirement Suit for $85 Million." According to the article:
Approximately 20,000 current and former Enron Corp. employees who lost money in their retirement plans when the company collapsed in late 2001 will participate in an $85 million settlement of a class-action lawsuit.The tentative settlement, filed yesterday, would be the largest to date for a case involving company stock in retirement plans, said Lynn Sarko, the attorney representing the employees. Earlier this year, employees of Global Crossing Ltd. settled for $79 million, and employees of Lucent Technologies Inc. settled for $69 million.
The article further notes that the "partial settlement resolves claims against Enron's human-resource staff and company directors, but doesn't settle claims against top Enron executives." The settlement does not resolve claims against Northern Trust Corp. or Arthur Andersen.
More on the settlement from the New York Times here.
Read the story behind the Crowley v. Corning case from this recent article from the New York Times, "All the Nest Eggs in One Company Basket":
Such stories abound in this company town, where loyalty, self-interest and faith in the company led many to bet their retirement portfolios almost exclusively on the stock of their employer. Economists said what happened here offered a pristine window on the mixed fortunes and stresses that come with retirement accounts based on company stock.
Read the resulting case--Crowley et al. v. Corning--and how the company's motion to dismiss in that case was granted. Nixon Peabody LLP has a recent article on a later case--Crowley v. Corning Incorporated, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 758 (W.D.N.Y. 1/14/04)--in which the court addresses plaintiff's motion to reopen the prior 2002 decision. Plaintiffs had sought to reopen the case by submitting "a handful of new cases, including the Enron decision and a similar decision involving WorldCom." However, the court distinguished all of these cases and affirmed its prior 2002 decision in this recent 2004 decision.
The 2002 Crowley decision has been cited in numerous cases by defendants in ERISA 401(k) litigation involving company stock, and was cited by the court in the case of In re: Williams Cos. ERISA Litigation as pivotal authority in an unreported decision in which the court declined to to adopt the DOL's interpretation of the law as espoused in the DOL's Amicus Brief. (See this previous post where this unreported decision is discussed.) However, the DOL strongly notes in its WorldCom Amicus Brief that the Williams decision (which relied on Crowley) was "wrong" and "contrary to the weight of precedent."
Defendants sought to rely on the Crowley case in the Dynegy case, Constance K. Schied v. Dynegy, Inc., et al. but their motions to dismiss were not granted. (Read the opinion in a recent Order Denying Motion to Dismiss.) Another case where defendants sought to rely on Crowley, but did not prevail, was in the In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. ERISA Litigation. (Read the recent Memorandum Opinion and Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the Sears case.) Both the Dynegy and Sears opinions were rendered in March of this year.
A previous post here at ERISAblog entitled "Perils for Plan Fiduciaries: Deciding When and How to Sue For Losses" discussed some worrisome news in the In re WorldCom, Inc. Securities Litigation case about how certain fiduciaries of pension funds had possibly jeopardized their claims on behalf of plan participants by filing individual actions prior to a decision on class action certification and how the judge in the case had followed up with tough criticism of the law firm that represented the fiduciaries. I noted how "there is much for ERISA plan fiduciaries to be wary of in contemplating individual and class action lawsuits on behalf of plan participants." Apparently, the Department of Labor thinks so too as evidenced in their issuance of final Prohibited Transaction Exemption 2003-39 (pdf version) (html version) covering issues pertaining to the settlement of litigation by employee benefits plans with parties in interest. The main purpose of the exemption is to permit plans to release claims against "parties in interest" in connection with settlements of ongoing or threatened litigation where the DOL is not a party to the litigation. The exemption is an important one for the benefits community in light of the fact that, as discussed previously, many plans will be, or already are, bringing lawsuits on behalf of plan participants trying to recoup losses from recent corporate scandals as well as mutual fund scandals.
Why does the DOL need to issue an exemption for a plan fiduciary to enter into a settlement on behalf of a plan? When plan fiduciaries enter into such agreements on behalf of plans which are suing such entities as the employer, an investment provider, etc, those entities are normally "parties in interest" (i.e. related to the plan under ERISA and DOL regulations). And without going into detail about all of the complicated prohibited transaction rules, suffice it to say that the DOL views a potential claim or "chose in action" as a type of property and that a plan's release of its claim against such party in interest may constitute a prohibited sale or exchange with the plan, as well as a prohibited transfer or use of plan assets for the benefit of a party in interest. (See DOL Opinion Letter 95-26A which provides some guidance regarding how this type of prohibited transaction can occur. Also, see PTE 1999-31.)
However, in spite of its views, the DOL notes the confusion surrounding the issue and that "some attorneys may have advised their clients that the settlement of litigation with a party in interest is not the type of transaction intended to be covered by section 406 of the Act." With this in mind, here is what the DOL says about the reason for its issuance of the exemption:
As the Department noted in proposing this exemption, the fact that a transaction is subject to an administrative exemption is not dispositive of whether the transaction is, in fact, a prohibited transaction. Rather, the exemption is being granted in response to uncertainty expressed on the part of plan fiduciaries charged with the responsibility under ERISA for determining whether it is in the interests of a plan's participants and beneficiaries to enter into a settlement agreement with a party in interest. The comments have confirmed the department's earlier conclusion that there was considerable uncertainty surrounding this issue. After considering all of the comments, the Department has determined that the exemption, as revised, appropriately balances the concerns of these commentators while allowing plan fiduciaries to properly carry out their responsibilities under ERISA.
The exemption is really narrowly tailored to address those settlement agreements which result in prohibited transactions. However, there is DOL guidance in the exemption which really has application for fiduciaries on a broader scale so that the exemption can serve somewhat as a "manual" for ERISA plan fiduciaries who find themselves having to enter into settlements on behalf of plan participants.
However, I wish to note one aspect of the exemption which is troubling from the standpoint of the effect it will have on the cost of litigation and trying to make plan participants whole--that is, the DOL's requirement in the exemption that the plan must obtain the opinion of an attorney representing the plan that a "genuine controversy exists." (i>Formal legal opinions are almost always a costly endeavor.) Now I suppose I should be singing' Dixie and praising the DOL for enhancing the flow of work to benefits and ERISA attorneys around the country, but I get concerned when I think of all that is going on here. When you think about the fact that participants have already been harmed in the matter and that attorneys representing the plan will receive a sizable portion of any settlement, and when you add to that, the requirement that the plan engage an "independent fiduciary" as well as this requirement that the plan engage an attorney to write an opinion that there is a "genuine controversy," all of this adds up to a great deal of cost which will eat away at any recovery for plan participants. Apparently, according to language in the original proposed exemption, the purpose of the attorney opinion requirement is as follows:
The Department believes that this condition is necessary to prevent the plan and parties in interest from engaging in a sham transaction purporting to fall within this class exemption, thus shielding a transaction, such as an extension of credit, that would otherwise be prohibited. The existence of a genuine controversy must be determined by an attorney retained to advise the plan. That attorney must be independent of the other parties to the litigation.
In the preamble to the final exemption, the DOL notes one commenter who recommended retaining the requirement for a genuine controversy, but without requiring an attorney opinion so that the attorney review would be permitted, but not required, as a safe harbor in certain situations. To me, this makes much more sense and would avoid needless cost for the majority of plans which find themselves in the position of having to recoup losses in litigation, for which the issue of "genuine controversy" is a far-gone conclusion. In other words, requiring all plans to obtain the opinion of counsel to avoid the possible abuse which can occur in the minority of cases is rather like trying to kill a fly with a bazooka. Nevertheless, this final exemption will require the opinion of counsel, except in situations where the case has been certified for class-action.
Some additional comments about the exemption:
(1) The DOL has eliminated the requirement that the independent fiduciary "negotiate" the settlement because it realizes that in class action settlements, the "plan fiduciary's role in negotiating the terms of the settlement may be limited." However, the DOL warns that "even where negotiation does not take place between the plan and the defendant, a fiduciary will be compelled, consistent with ERISA's fiduciary responsibility provisions, to make a decision regarding the settlement on behalf of the plan, even if that decision is merely to accept or reject a proposed settlement negotiated by other class members."
(2) Regarding class action lawsuits, the DOL had much to say in the exemption. A Plan fiduciary, faced with a non-opt out class action settlement, "must take such actions as are appropriate under the particular circumstances" and "object to its terms" where necessary on behalf of plan participants. "If the fiduciary takes no action, and the case is settled for far less than the full value of the plan's losses, the burden will be on the fiduciary to justify its inaction."
(3) The original proposed exemption only allowed the receipt of cash in exchange for a release. The final exemption permits "assets other than cash" where necessary to rescind a transaction that is the subject of the litigation, or where such assets are qualifying employer securities for which there is a generally recognized market and value.
(5) The final exemption provides that the settlement must be reasonable in light of the plan's likelihood of full recovery, the risks and costs of litigation, and the value of claims foregone.
(6) Finally, the DOL addresses the fact that it is not uncommon for the same transactions to give rise to both ERISA and securities fraud claims and that participants and/or fiduciaries have been able to modify the terms of a release to permit the plan to receive a share of the securities fraud settlement without releasing its ERISA claims against the parties in interest. The DOL notes "that plan fiduciaries should consider whether additional relief may be available for the ERISA claims before agreeing to a broad release."
After making my way through most of the 331-page decision in Tittle v. Enron Corp., 2003 WL 22245394 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2003), the part of the opinion that stands out the most is the directed trustee discussion which may, in the end, have the most far-reaching impact in the benefits arena. In Count II of the case, Plaintiff-participants of the Enron 401(k) plan and the ESOP, have sued a trust company for breach of its fiduciary duties based on the lockdown (freeze, blackout) of the two plans, alleging inadequate notice to participants. The reason for the lockdown was that the plans were switching to a new record keeper and the trust company was in the process of transferring the business to a new trustee. Count III also alleges a failure to diversify the 401(k) plan's assets. As part of the allegation, the complaint alleges that the trust company should not have followed the plan administrative committee's directions that were contrary to ERISA.
The "Directed Trustee Liability" discussion (beginning on page 109 of the opinion) begins with the "factual dispute" over whether the trust company was a "directed" trustee or a "discretionary trustee." Plaintiffs argued that it was the latter and the trust company argued it was the former:
The complaint alleges that [the trust company] was the trustee of the Savings Plan and exercised discretionary authority and control over plan assets when it imposed the lockdown, in spite of the fact that it had the power to postpone the lockdown until the price of Enron stock stabilized to avoid injury to the participants, and that numerous red flags should have alerted [the trustee company] to the dangers of proceeding with the scheduled lockdown. Furthermore, the complaint asserts, plan documents and the trust agreement gave [the trust company] discretionary authority and control over plan assets and plan administration where there was no direction by the Administrative Committee. Alternatively, the complaint asserts that if [the trust company] was a directed trustee and if the Administrative Committee gave written instructions to [the trust company] regarding the lockdown, [the trust company] breached its fiduciary duties in following the lockdown instructions because the directions were contrary to ERISA and [the trust company] knew or should have known that the lockdown instructions violated ERISA.The court first notes the fact that caselaw addressing the duties of a directed trustee is "minimal" and also "in conflict" and then goes on to try to interpret the confusing provisions of ERISA pertaining to the subject, beginning with section 403(a)(2) of ERISA:[The trust company] contends that it was a "directed trustee," as opposed to a "discretionary" trustee, under provisions in the plan documents and trust agreement that subject it to direction by the Administrative Committee, that the Administrative Committee exercised total authority and discretion over the plan assets and management, and that [the trust company] thus had no responsibility or liability for the lockdown.
All assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust by one or more trustees. Such trustee or trustees shall be either named in the trust instrument or in the plan instrument described in section 402(a) or appointed by a person who is a named fiduciary, and upon acceptance of being named or appointed, the trustee or trustees shall have exclusive authority and discretion to manage and control the assets of the plan, except to the extent that -The court then seeks to provide meaning to the terms "proper" and "made in accordance with the terms of the plan" and "not contrary to ERISA" and places great emphasis upon the statutory construction of section 403(a)(2) of ERISA espoused in Patricia W. Hatamyar's article See no Evil? The Role of the Directed Trustee under ERISA, 64 Tennessee Law Review 1-90 (1996):(1) the plan expressly provides that the trustee or trustees are subject to the direction of a named fiduciary who is not a trustee, in which case the trustee shall be subject to proper directions of such fiduciary which are made in accordance with the terms of the plan and which are not contrary to [ERISA].
The Court has found Ms. Hatamyar's article to be the most extensive and authoritative source regarding construction of statutory provisions in ERISA relating to the directed trustee. The article is cited as persuasive authority by most of the few courts addressing the directed trustee issue.
Defendants argued that a directed trustee was only required "to determine whether the directed action facially complies with the terms of the plan and of ERISA and relied on this paragraph in the legislative history of ERISA section 403(a)(1) as its main authority:
If the plan provides that the trustees are subject to the direction of named fiduciaries, then the trustees are not to have the exclusive management and control over the plan assets, but generally are to follow the directions of the named fiduciary. Therefore, if the plan sponsor wants an investment committee to direct plan investments, he may provide for such an arrangement in the plan. In addition, since investment decisions are basic to plan operations, members of such an investment committee are to be named fiduciaries . . . . If the plan so provides, the trustee who is directed by an investment committee is to follow that committee's directions unless it is clear on their face that the actions to be taken under those directions would be prohibited by the fiduciary responsibility rules of the bill or would be contrary to the terms of the plan or trust.The American Bankers Association also supported this position in its Amicus Brief (link via Benefitslink.com) and placed great importance on the fact that "the banking and trust industry has relied on this facial compliance standard since ERISA was enacted in 1974." The Court rejected this argument.
Instead, the court cited "rules of statutory construction, the common law roots of the directed trustee concept, the Department of Labor's interpretation, as well as some of the case law, in support for its position" and held:
After extensive research, this Court concludes for the reasons discussed supra that even where the named fiduciary appears to have been granted full control, authority and/or discretion over that portion of activity of plan management and/or plan assets at issue in a suit and the plan trustee is directed to perform certain actions within that area, the directed trustee still retains a degree of discretion, authority, and responsibility that may expose him to liability, as reflected in the structure and language of provisions of ERISA. At least some fiduciary status and duties of a directed trustee are preserved, even though the scope of its "exclusive authority and discretion to manage and control the assets of the plan" has been substantially constricted by the directing named fiduciary's correspondingly broadened role, and breach of those duties may result in liability.It is interesting that the court went through pages and pages of discussion over why it believed the standard was not the "facial compliance standard", but then in the end concluded that even if that had been the standard, it would have ruled that plaintiffs had stated a claim.In any ERISA retirement plan, where the plaintiffs, as in Tittle, allege with factual support that the directed trustee knew or should have known from a number of significant waving red flags and/or regular reviews of the company's financial statements that the employer company was in financial danger and its stock greatly diminished in value, yet the named fiduciary, to which the plan allocated all control over investments by the plan, directed the trustee to continue purchasing the employer's stock, there is [a]factual question whether the evidence is sufficient to give rise to a fiduciary duty by the directed trustee to investigate the advisability of purchasing the company stock to insure that the action is in compliance with ERISA as well as the plan.
Finally, even if the Court construed section 403(a) to require only that the trustee find that the directions he received from the named fiduciary are "proper" and facially in compliance with the terms of the plan and of ERISA, it finds that the Tittle Plaintiffs still state a claim: "Plaintiffs submit that any order to proceed with lockdowns on its face violated the duties of prudence and circumstances, laid out in the complaint, made its timing highly suspect and clearly injurious to plan participants and beneficiaries.
Also, please note that the WorldCom decision discussed in a previous post here also seems to reject the "facial compliance standard," but did not seem to go as far as the court did in the Enron case. (Interestingly enough, footnote 8 of the case notes that the directed trustee in that case argued that the "facial compliance standard" should apply, but the court said that it was "not an issue that must be resolved at this stage of the litigation.") In WorldCom, the court ruled that the directed trustee "was not required to exercise its independent judgment in deciding how and whether to [invest employee funds as directed]. It only had to make sure [that WorldCom's] directions were proper, in accordance with the terms of the plan, and not contrary to ERISA." The court in WorldCom went on to say that if the directed trustee in the case "followed instructions to invest employee funds in WorldCom stock when a prudent trustee would know that WorldCom's decision to continue to offer its own stock to its employees as an investment option was imprudent, or otherwise in violation of WorldCom's obligation under ERISA," then the directed trustee might be liable as an ERISA fiduciary. In other words, the standard in WorldCom seems to be that the directed trustee is only liable if it "knows" the direction is not proper, in accordance with the terms of the plan, or contrary to ERISA, whereas the standard promulgated in the Enron case seems to be that the directed trustee will be liable if it "should have known."
Are there any flaws to this reasoning? And what is the impact of this decision and the WorldCom decision on those entities serving as directed trustees? Stay tuned for Part II of this discussion . . .
You can access this transcript of a CNBC interview with Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner entitled "Richard Posner discusses his position on law, pragmatism and democracy" at this link. (Thanks to Howard and JD2B for the link.) The interview occured Monday, July 28th, prior to the issuance of the opinion in the Xerox case, Berger et al. v. Xerox, which was written by Judge Posner. Mario Bartiromo for CNBC asked Judge Posner about how he views cases involving employees who are suing pension funds over reduced payments. You can read his response at the link above. Interestingly enough, as mentioned here before, Judge Posner may also be one of the judges who will decide the appeal in Cooper et al. v. IBM Personal Pension Plan et al. since that case will go to the Seventh Circuit as well.
The Wall Street Journal has an intriguing article today that raises all sorts of questions in my mind: "Memos Sent to IBM Show Awareness Of Pension Moves." (Subscription required.) While I am sure that there are many other cases where internal memos have been terribly damaging to a defendant's cause, one comes to mind which has been in the news lately . . .More on this later.
Ari Weinberg for Forbes reports: "Pension Plans Wade Into Murky Water." The article quotes James Klein, president of the American Benefits Council, as saying that even though the IBM decision issued last week really "flies in the face of other court decisions," critics of cash balance plans will try to play it for all that is worth. The article suggests plaintiffs' attorneys may attempt to bring more lawsuits in the cash balance plan arena.
Mary Deibel for Scripps Howard News Service via the Albuquerque Tribune also has this article entitled "Pension tension prompts legal fight." The article contains some information regarding the cash balance plans for Verizon and FedEx which give older workers a choice between the old formula and the cash balance plan formula.
Andrea Coombes for CBS Marketwatch reports: "Cash-balance plans under fire: Court ruling against IBM could invalidate all such plans.
Christopher Oster for today's edition of the Wall Street Journal reports: "The ERISA Trap: When Employees Can't Sue." The article makes the point that whether or not a disability insurance plan is covered by ERISA could make a big difference from a litigation standpoint if the employee is wrongfully denied a claim and wants to sue, i.e. that insurance companies prefer that ERISA apply because the likelihood of recovery by the employee is less.
The subject was also covered by Workforce Management magazine (at Workforce.com) in their July, 2003 issue in an article by Douglas P. Shuit entitled "Nasty Business." (Subscription required.) That article provides a more in depth discussion of why recovery under ERISA is so difficult to obtain, stating correctly that ERISA limits the participant's right to a jury trial and prevents participants from recovering punitive or compensatory damages. (Despite the difficulties with suing under ERISA, the article quotes Raymond Bourhis of San Francisco as predicting that there are going to be a huge number of class action "lawsuits filed against employers, as well as insurance companies, alleging conspiracy and collusion to deprive ERISA-preempted workers' protections under state law.")
Note: In contrast, another area of ERISA litigation--involving alleged ERISA fiduciary breaches--has been called an "oasis for plaintiffs' lawyers." (See this previous post which mentions an article by Jason Hoppin for the Recorder at Law.com--"A Matter of Trust: Stung by corporate collapses, workers look to ERISA for relief"--which discusses how ERISA has become an "oasis for plaintiffs' lawyers, where you can make new law, the bar is friendly on both sides of the aisle, there are few competitors and, of course, huge recoveries are the norm.")
"Judge Gives Initial Approval To Medco Settlement": the Journal reports in this article that a federal court judge has given preliminary approval to an agreement to settle a series of ERISA-related class action lawsuits against pharmacy benefit manager Medco Health Solutions for $42.5 million." FT.com also reports: "Medco wins tentative approval for settlement." However, this article--Federal Judge Grants Preliminary Approval to Medco Health Class-Action Settlement"--at Stock World (Germany) provides the most detailed coverage of the settlement.
PR Newswire has this regarding the case: "Cash Balance Court Ruling Could Harm U.S. Pension System, According to Watson Wyattt." From the news release:
"This ruling has the potential to cause great harm to the U.S. private pension system," said Eric Lofgren, Global Director of the Benefit Consulting Group of Watson Wyatt Worldwide. "Moreover, two other district courts and the U.S. Treasury Department have previously reached the opposite conclusion concerning the validity of cash balance plans."
SmartMoney.com reports in an article by Arden Dale for the Dow Jones Newswires: "IBM Pension Ruling Stirs Debate." The article quotes J. Mark Iwry, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and the former benefits tax counsel at the Treasury Department as saying that it "is likely that the issue will ultimately be resolved neither by the appellate courts nor by the executive branch but by the Congress." The article also quotes William Sweetnam, benefits tax counsel at Treasury as saying that Judge Murphy's decision does not refer to the Treasury initiative. Mr. Sweetnam also commented that the agency would continue to go "forward with our reg writing process."
More on the IBM Cash Balance Plan decision handed down yesterday and reported on here yesterday:
Albert B. Crenshaw for the WashingtonPost.com reports: "Judge Finds Age Bias in IBM Pensions: Experts Say Ruling Could End Other Employers' 'Cash Balance' Plans."
The American Benefits Council has issued a statement on the case. James Klein, ABC's President, states:
"Conversions to cash balance plans are currently the one good thing going on in the defined benefit pension plan system because they demonstrate a commitment by employers to remain within the defined benefit world. Other companies are exiting the system altogether. A decision like this sends one more negative signal to employers that 'no good deed goes unpunished' since it penalizes employers trying to provide their workers with a pension that is funded by the employer and guaranteed by the government, as opposed to requiring workers to rely solely on employee-funded retirement alternatives."You can also access a copy of the case on their website as well.
PlanSponsor.com reports: "Murphy’s Law: IBM Loses Cash Balance Ruling." (One time registration required.)
The Associated Press in this article--"IBM loses lawsuit over pensions: Federal judge rules firm discriminated against older workers at MSNBC.com quotes Mr. Klein as saying that "cash balance plans are 'currently the one good thing going' in an environment where many companies are dropping pension plans altogether and requiring employees to save for retirement on their own."
Reish Luftman McDaniel & Reicher provides this article: Taking Stock: Managing the Risk of Company Stock. The article provides some good suggestions for minimizing ERISA fiduciary risk where a 401(k) offers company stock as a match and/or as an investment option.
(Note: The article does not discuss plan governance structure or procedural prudence which, in my opinion, are also very important in minimizing ERISA fiduciary liability.)
"Employees vs. executives: BellSouth, Scientific-Atlanta sued over management of company retirement plans": MSNBCNews reports that ERISA lawsuits have been filed against BellSouth Corp. and Scientific-Atlanta Inc. The article mentions the Enron and Worldcom lawsuits (which have been discussed here previously) and how all of these cases have brought an increased focus on the role of ERISA fiduciaries. The article also mentions the trend, particularly among the airline industry, of hiring independent fiduciaries to oversee plan investment decisions to avoid having the executives make these decisions "with all the conflict of interest that entails."
That is what today's edition of the Wall Street Journal is reporting in an article by Joseph Pereira entitled: "To Save on Health-Care Costs, Firms Fire Disabled Workers: Policy Shift at Polaroid Leads to Scrimping, New Worries for Extremely Sick Employees." (Subscription required.) The article contains some heart-wrenching stories of how the disabled have been impacted by what the Journal says is a trend among companies of dismissing the disabled to cut costs. The article refers to a Mercer Human Resource Consulting study last year which found that 27% of the 723 companies surveyed dismiss employees as soon as they go on long-term disability and that 24% dismiss them at a set time thereafter, usually six to 12 months, with only 15% of companies keeping the disabled on as employees with benefits until age 65. The article also refers to DOL statistics which show that there has been a 62% increase in those on long term disability since 1992 and suggests an "aging work force" could be the cause.
All of this is further complicated by the Ninth Circuit case last year "Lessard v. Applied Risk Management" in which the court held that a buyer and a seller in a corporate transaction violated Section 510 of ERISA where the buyer (in an asset sale) did not hire seller's employees who were on extended leave of absence. Section 510 of ERISA provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan, this subchapter, section 1201 of this title, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act [29 U.S.C. 301 et seq.], or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan, this subchapter, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act.You can read about the case in an article by BenefitNews.com and in an article by White & Case LLP. The Journal reports a lawsuit having been filed last week against Polaroid on the issue in federal court in Boston.
The Philadelphia Inquirer has an article by Todd Mason--"Easing up on company stock"--which discusses the impact that class-action lawsuits are having on companies' offering company stock as a match or an investment. (The article reports that Seattle-based Keller Rohrback has "18 class-action suits alleging fraud in 401(k) plans and company stock, including one filed in February against Cigna Corp.")
CorpLawBlog and 10b-5 Daily have both written about this case--In Re Merrill Lynch & Col., Inc. Research Reports Securities Litigation (June 30, 2003)--which you can read about in today's edition of the Wall Street Journal and here at FindLaw.com. The following paragraphs from the opinion written by Judge Milton Pollack of the Southern District of New York reveal his low opinion of the claims being brought:
At the times here involved, the stock markets were in the throes of a colossal "bubble" of panic proportions. Speculators abounded to capitalize on the opportunities presented by this bubble.The market "bubble" burst intervened before plaintiffs got out of their holdings and their holdings lost value. The plaintiffs, learning of the subsequent actions of the regulators concerning the conflicts mentioned above, rushed to the courts in these cases seeking to recover the losses they experienced due to the intervening cause, the burst of the bubble. . .
The record clearly reveals that plaintiffs were among the high-risk speculators who, knowing full well or being properly chargeable with appreciation of the unjustifiable risks they were undertaking in the extremely volatile and highly untested stocks at issue, now hope to twist the federal securities laws into a scheme of cost-free speculators’ insurance. Seeking to lay the blame for the enormous Internet Bubble solely at the feet of a single actor, Merrill Lynch, plaintiffs would have this Court conclude that the federal securities laws were meant to underwrite, subsidize, and encourage their rash speculation in joining a freewheeling casino that lured thousands obsessed with the fantasy of Olympian riches, but which delivered such riches to only a scant handful of lucky winners. Those few lucky winners, who are not before the Court, now hold the monies that the unlucky plaintiffs have lost -- fair and square -- and they will never return those monies to plaintiffs. Had plaintiffs themselves won the game instead of losing, they would have owed not a single penny of their winnings to those they left to hold the bag (or to defendants).
(Coincidentally, another New York federal judge, Harold Baer Jr., also dismissed class-action claims Tuesday against three other Wall Street firms by investors alleging losses on the stock of Covad Communications Co. Those firms were Goldman Sachs Group Inc., the Credit Suisse First Boston unit of Credit Suisse Group, and Morgan Stanley. The Wall Street Journal reports that Judge Baer's ruling was made on narrower procedural grounds, didn't include such fiery criticism of the plaintiffs, and wasn't considered as likely to affect other cases.)
What's the impact of this case on other litigation, including the post-Enron ERISA litigation which is going on in the courts and which has been discussed here frequently?
The Wall Street Journal reports John Coffee, a Columbia University professor who specializes in securities law, as saying that the ruling was "a significant victory for Merrill Lynch" and that it might well set a precedent in other similar cases. However, he said it might not apply to other situations where the analysts were so close to the management of companies they followed that they may have known about adverse information that they did not include in their reports.
It seems that the case should have little impact on the post-Enron 401(k) litigation involving company stock since those cases will focus on whether the ERISA fiduciaries involved were fulfilling or breaching their fiduciary duties under ERISA by continuing to invest in company stock and/or offer the company stock as an investment for participants. Many times the complaints have alleged fiduciaries had inside information which they had a duty to disclose to other fiduciaries and to the participants of the plans involved. It is doubtful that "the burst of the bubble" theory, in those cases, would be deemed to relieve ERISA fiduciaries from liability for losses incurred by participants where fiduciaries had inside information and/or failed to act with "procedural prudence."
"Qwest workers' retirement plummets": Rocky Mountain News.com reports that an annual regulatory filing by Qwest reveals that both the Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service are examining Qwest's 401(k) retirement savings plan. The plan is also the subject of employee lawsuits.
"Former Kmart execs want suit to be dismissed": Gary Haber for the Detroit Free Press reports on the Motion to Dismiss heard yesterday by U.S. District Judge Avern Cohn in Detroit on the 401(k) class action lawsuit brought by Kmart employees.
I have read the DOL complaint filed this week against Enron and others, Chao v. Enron Corporation et al., and what follows is a summary of the allegations made in the case. Please remember that these are merely allegations made in the complaint, and that a trier of fact will have to determine which, if any, of the allegations are true. The summary would be helpful, I think, to ERISA plan fiduciaries, as well as those who advise ERISA plan fiduciaries, since it demonstrates to some extent at least the DOL's views on how an ERISA plan fiduciary should or should not act in fulfilling its duties and obligations under ERISA:
Defendants in the Case:
Because they were the "named fiduciaries" the complaint alleges they were responsible for managing and overseeing the Plans' investments in Enron stock "solely in the interest of the Plans' participants and beneficiaries."
It is also alleged that the Savings Plan document specifically gave to the Committee the duty to direct the Trustee as to the investment of the Trust Fund in Enron stock and that the ESOP plan document specifically gave the Committee the responsibility to direct the Trustee as to the purchase and sale of Enron stock as well. If the Committee did not direct the Trustee of the ESOP, the ESOP trustee was responsible for the "administration, investment and management" of the ESOP assets.
Allegations:
The complaint alleges that the Committee only met as a group five times during 2001, that none of the meetings were attended by all of the Committee Defendants, and that "at none of these meetings did the Administrative Committee discuss or review the Plans' investments in Enron stock or discuss the Plans' catastrophic losses." The complaint alleges that, only after an investor class action lawsuit was filed, did the Administrative Committee take notice of the "volatility" of Enron's stock, meeting almost daily after the lawsuit was filed, but even then never taking any action with respect to the Plans' investment in Enron stock.
Finally, the DOL alleges that "at no time did any of the Committee Defendants take any action to effectively monitor, review, analyze, question, alter, slow, stop or protect the plans' investment in Enron stock."
Of particular note, is the allegation that a certain member of the Committee "failed to inform the other members of the Administrative Committee about Watkins' concerns and failed to ensure that any inquiry was undertaken on the Plans' behalf into those concerns."
Comment: Absent from the complaint is any mention of the trustee for the Savings Plan, Northern Trust, which was the directed trustee for the Savings Plan and one of the focuses of the DOL's Amicus Brief filed in the Enron class-action lawsuit.
Also, please note that the governing documents for the ESOP provided that the ESOP would be "primarily" invested in Enron stock. In addition, the governing documents for the Savings Plan provided that participants could contribute up to 15% of their pay to the Plan and could direct their investments into a variety of investment funds, including an Enron stock fund. In addition, Enron made matching contributions to the Savings Plan and the Savings Plan provided that these matching contributions would "primarily" be invested in Enron stock.
More on Enron ERISA litigation here. . .
The Houston Chronicle has this article by Eric Berger: "Former Enron employees welcome Labor suit." The article discusses the separate class action lawsuit filed some time ago by former Enron employees which you can read about here. The article reports that lawyers for the former employees in the class action suit said "having a government agency endorse many of the same legal theories will only bolster their case." The article also reports that "[t}he biggest pot of money available is probably $85 million in liability insurance Enron had purchased for those responsible for Enron's retirement plans."
More on the Chao v. Enron Corporation et al. lawsuit filed yesterday . . .
Kirstin Downey for the WashingtonPost reports: "Restitution Sought From Enron Officials." The article quotes Marc Machiz, a former Labor Department lawyer in charge of pension programs, as stating that "the lawsuit could have ramifications for the "30 to 40" private lawsuits moving through the courts that allege that executives exhorted workers to buy stock that subsequently fell in value." The article quotes Mr. Machiz as stating further that workers at many other companies were hurt as badly or almost as badly as at Enron, including those at WorldCom Inc., Global Crossing Ltd., Williams Cos. and Dynegy Inc.
The Associated Press for the Boston Globe reports in this article: "US sues Enron over pension losses: Ex-executives, directors also targeted in attempt to recover millions."
I am reviewing the DOL Enron complaint filed yesterday and will report on it here shortly. In the meantime, you can read more on the lawsuit here . . .
The Secretary of Labor has filed a lawsuit in the federal district court of Houston, Texas against Enron, Kenneth Lay and Jeff Skilling, the Administrative Committee members of Enron's ESOP and 401(k), and members of the Board of Directors for Enron. According to the press release issued by the DOL, the suit seeks to recover losses plan participants suffered "due to the mismanagement of two of Enron's pension plans." You can view the complaint filed here as well as a Fact Sheet and Chronology of Enron-related DOL Activity, both posted on the DOL's website here.
The following remarks were made by Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao today in announcing the lawsuit:
We are sending a message to every pension plan officer, director and fiduciary: you have a solemn duty to safeguard your employees’ pension assets. If you put those assets in jeopardy through neglect or malfeasance, we will hold you accountable.
That's the advice in this article--"401(k) trustees feel heat"--by Harriet Johnson Brackey for the Miami Herald. Derek Loeser, a partner in the Seattle law firm Keller Rohrback, in discussing ERISA plan fiduciaries states: "[t]heir duty as fiduciaries is the highest known to law. This should remind them they can't operate on autopilot.'' Thomas Noonan, president of Union Financial, a registered investment advisor in Fort Lauderdale, warns that "especially at smaller companies, the 401(k) plan trustees often rely blindly on an investment advisor." A good time for ERISA fiduciaries to consider this . . .
As stated previously, you can access the Opinion and Order entered in the In Re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litigation case (Southern District of New York) here. (via WorldComErisaLawsuit.com) You can also access the pleadings in the case at WorldComErisaLawsuit.com as well. The action is being brought by participants in the WorldCom 401(k) Salary Savings Plan (the "Plan").
The facts as alleged: The Plan provided a number of different funds, among which was a fund invested in WorldCom stock. WorldCom was the sponsor of the Plan, the named fiduciary of the Plan, the Plan Administrator, as well as the Investment Fiduciary. The Plan authorized WorldCom to appoint others to act as Administrator or Investment Fiduciary for the Plan, but WorldCom did not do so. A very key provision of the Plan was Section 14.02 which provided that "any WorldCom officer had authority to perform WorldCom's functions as Plan Administrator and Investment Fiduciary." However, if WorldCom did not appoint individuals to carry out the duties, then "any officer" of WorldCom had "the authority to carry out" on behalf of WorldCom, the "duties of the Administrator and the Investment Fiduciary."
Here is a rundown of the complaints which did or did not survive the Motions to Dismiss:
Key Points of the Case:
1) The court held that plaintiffs stated a claim for breach of ERISA fiduciary duty "by alleging that Ebbers, Miller and Merrill Lynch were obligated to but failed to act with prudence regarding the Plan's continued offer of WorldCom stock as a Plan investment." The court went on to say: "WorldCom stock could have been removed as one of the investments offered under the Plan without amending the Plan and plaintiffs have adequately alleged that these fiduciaries should have, but failed, to consider or recommend doing so."
2) The court also held a claim was sufficient that alleged Ebbers failed to disclose "material facts he knew or should have known about the financial condition of WorldCom." Ebbers had argued that the duty to disclose arose under the federal securities laws and not under ERISA. The court stated that "Ebbers's potential liability to employees who invested in WorldCom stock through the Plan for violations of the federal securities laws cannot shield him from suit over his alleged failure to perform his quite separate and independent ERISA obligations." The court also stated: "When a corporate insider puts on his ERISA hat, he is not assumed to have forgotten adverse information he may have acquired while acting in his corporate capacity."
3) Plaintiffs' third claim alleged that Ebbers and Miller (Employee Benefits Director) breached their fiduciary duties by making material misrepresentations about the soundness of WorldCom stock and the prudence of an investment in WorldCom stock, and by transmitting materials containing the misrepresentations to Plan participants. The misrepresentations were alleged to have been contained in WorldCom's SEC filings.
Ebbers and Miller argued that this claim imposed "a continuous duty of disclosure on ERISA fiduciaries that overwhelms the federal securities law disclosure requirements and compels fiduciaries to violate the prohibitions against insider trading." The court noted that the defendants were trying to describe a "tension between the federal securities laws and ERISA that would require the dismissal" of the claim, but ruled against the defendants, stating that "[t]hose who are ERISA fiduciaries . . cannot in violation of their fiduciary obligations desseminate false information to plan participants, including false information contained in SEC filings." The court acknowledged the "difficulties that exist in the analysis of this claim" due to the fact that Ebbers was both a corporate insider and an ERISA fiduciary, but stated:
"While there may be some case in which there will be a conflict between the two statutory schemes, it is not so evident that a conflict exists here. The Complaint alleges that WorldCom's SEC filings contained material misrepresentations regarding WorldCom's financial condition. Having spoken in its periodic SEC filings about the company's financial condition, WorldCom had a duty under the federal securities laws to correct any prior material misrepresentation when it became aware of the falsity."
You can access the Opinion and Order issued Tuesday by U.S. District Judge Denise Cote of the Southern District of New York in the case of In Re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litigation here. (via WorldComERISALawsuit.com) To be discussed . . .
U.S. District Judge Denise Cote of the Southern District of New York, in a 49-page opinion released late Tuesday, refused to dismiss ERISA claims against WorldCom Chief Executive Bernie Ebbers and others as reported here at Law.com. Much more on this later . . .
Readers have been expressing interest in some links for the ERISA litigation which has been the subject of several posts so I will list some important ones here and will create a section in the index under "401(k) Litigation Links":
That is what Ronald Kilgard of Keller Rohrback says about the wave of post-Enron litigation against 401(k) plan sponsors under ERISA. This article--"Send in the Lawyers: Ethical Lapses Spawn Fiduciary Lawsuits"--for Defined Contribution News discusses the lack of staffing at the DOL and reports why the DOL has seemed to focus on filing amicus briefs in the cases, instead of filing its own actions. The article reports Steven Saxon, a partner in the Groom Law Group, as saying the DOL "doesn't have the staffing to do its own cases" so that they have "made a decision to expend resources in appellate work...to have an impact when they file an amicus."
See yesterday's post here for additional articles on the subject.
A very analytical article by David M. Gische and Jo Ann Abramson of Ross, Dixon & Bell LLP at Findlaw.com: "Corporate Fiduciary Liability Claims In The Post-Enron Era." The article provides a detailed discussion of the class-action litigation that is going on in the ERISA arena against ERISA plan fiduciaries of 401(k) plans. The article gives a rundown of the Enron, Global Crossing, WorldCom, and Qwest cases which are making their way through the courts and provides a discussion about the parallel securities law claims which may provide double exposure for insurers, if the ERISA claims succeed.
Another article by Jason Hoppin for the Recorder at Law.com--"A Matter of Trust: Stung by corporate collapses, workers look to ERISA for relief"--also discusses the "burgeoning arena of ERISA cases filed on behalf of company employees who lose their retirement savings when corporate scandals hit." He calls it "an oasis for plaintiffs' lawyers, where you can make new law, the bar is friendly on both sides of the aisle, there are few competitors and, of course, huge recoveries are the norm."
CorpLawBlog at a post here and Securities Beacon have also reported on the subject today.
Gary Young for the National Law Journal at Law.com reports on the case of Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. 94-CV-633-H, from the Northern District of Oklahoma. The case, according to Law.com, represents only a handful of cases in which employees have prevailed in a claim that their employer violated ERISA "by closing a plant with the intent to shed employees whose benefit costs were high or who were on the verge of vesting in pensions." Unfortunately, the $36 million settlement will never reach the hands of plaintiffs unless a 10th Circuit Court rules on a "backpay" issue under ERISA, which many say is doomed under the holding of Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court last year.
While it is always important for a plan fiduciary to have an ERISA attorney involved in advising them about their fiduciary duties under ERISA, CFO.com does provide some very good online resources and tools for ERISA plan fiduciaries: this 401(K) Checklist for Fiduciaries, and this article delving into why employees file lawsuits against their employers over their 401(k) plans, as well the this very handy Buyer's Guide to 401(k) Plan Providers. The Guide allows users to compare the different providers and links allow the user to visit, from the online guide, the different websites of the various 401(k) providers.