“If IRS Agents Glare, the Trial’s Not Fair”

Suppose certain taxpayers are accused of tax evasion. However, during the trial, a large number of IRS and government agents sit directly behind the prosecution table throughout the trial and glare at the jurors, intimidating them, and causing some of…

Suppose certain taxpayers are accused of tax evasion. However, during the trial, a large number of IRS and government agents sit directly behind the prosecution table throughout the trial and glare at the jurors, intimidating them, and causing some of the jurors to fear that if they acquit the taxpayers, the IRS might retaliate against them. New trial required on the basis of jury intimidation and tampering? Is glaring enough to intimidate jurors? Possibly. The TaxProf Blog notes an interesting case which addresses those very facts, U.S. v. Rutherford, 371 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2004).

Employee Benefits Ramifications of WFTRA Definition of Dependent

A good article from Mellon: "New Definition of Dependent in Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 Affects Employee Benefits." (From Benefitslink.com)…

A good article from Mellon: “New Definition of Dependent in Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 Affects Employee Benefits.” (From Benefitslink.com)

Sometimes benefits and ERISA gets a little dry, and I have to turn to other areas of the law for humor. Thanks to Ernie the Attorney for the pointer to this case: Mayor v. Wedding. According to the court, the…

Sometimes benefits and ERISA gets a little dry, and I have to turn to other areas of the law for humor. Thanks to Ernie the Attorney for the pointer to this case: Mayor v. Wedding. According to the court, the burning issue in the case was as follows:

In this case we are called on to determine whether a cow is an uninsured motor vehicle under appellants’ insurance policy. We hold that it is not. On the night of September 5, 2001, appellants William R. Mayor, Jr., and Wendy M. Mayor were traveling on Interstate 76 west near milepost 41 when their vehicle struck a cow owned by Thomas Wedding. Apparently several of Mr. Wedding’s cows had wandered onto the highway. . .

There appears to be no dispute that there was a collision; the cow was not insured at the time of the collision; and that the cow caused the collision. The dispute in this case is whether the cow was a “land motor vehicle” as defined in the policy. While a cow is designed for operation on land, we do not believe a cow is a “motor vehicle.” The policy at issue does not separately define “motor vehicle;” therefore we must look to the common, ordinary meaning of this term. The American Heritage Dictionary defines “motor vehicle” as, “a self-propelled, wheeled conveyance that does not run on rails.” Id. at 817, 374 N.E.2d 146. A cow is self-propelled, does not run on rails, and could be used as a conveyance; however, there is no indication in the record that this particular cow had wheels. Therefore, it was not a motor vehicle and thus was not a “land motor vehicle” as defined in the policy. The trial court properly found that appellants were not entitled to uninsured motorist coverage. See State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Carriage Co. (1984), 98 Ohio App.3d 361, 648 N.E.2d 590 (finding that a horse was not a motor vehicle for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage;) Wilbur v. Allstate Ins. Co. (Nov. 29, 1991), 11th Dist. No. 90-G-1600, 1991 WL 252851 (finding that a horse and buggy was not a motor vehicle for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage.) To hold otherwise would be a manifestly absurd result. King, supra at 213, 519 N.E.2d 1380.

Please note that the reasoning in the case has nothing to do with the fact that a cow is a living creature and doesn’t have a motor, but that a cow doesn’t have wheels. Justice Bedsworth in an article here pokes fun at the opinion for doing so. He writes:

So how, you might ask, did the courts in Ohio come to the conclusion that neither a horse nor a cow is a MOTOR vehicle? How, you might wonder, did they sift through all the legal chaff to find the kernel of logic that separates warm-blooded barnyard animals from lifeless, steel MOTOR vehicles.

Go ahead, ask. Wonder.

Was it by taking judicial notice of the conspicuous absence of MOTORS in cows and horses? No, no. That would be way too easy. Nobody remembers opinions like that. No one writes odes to such prosaic analysis. . .

Overseas Outsourcing of Tax Services

Thanks to the TaxProf Blog for the pointer to this paper-"The Coming Accounting Revolution: Offshore Outsourcing of Tax Return Preparation" by Jesse Robertson, Dan Stone Ph. D., Liza Niederwanger, Matthew Grocki, Erica Martin, and Ed Smith. The paper starts out…

Thanks to the TaxProf Blog for the pointer to this paper–“The Coming Accounting Revolution: Offshore Outsourcing of Tax Return Preparation” by Jesse Robertson, Dan Stone Ph. D., Liza Niederwanger, Matthew Grocki, Erica Martin, and Ed Smith. The paper starts out as follows:

Although controversial and in its infancy, the overseas outsourcing of business processes is increasingly common in service industries such as banking, financial services, retailing, insurance and telecommunications. Economists and accounting professionals expect this trend to accelerate. For example, Deloitte Consulting LLP forecasts that 2 million financial services industry jobs will relocate overseas during the next few years (E-Business Strategies). Many larger CPA firms have begun shifting tax compliance work overseas, through outsourcing facilitators, to Charted Accountants (CAs) in India. The overseas outsourcing of tax compliance work enables CPAs to focus on higher margin services such as tax consulting, reduces labor costs, and increases the speed of tax return processing (eAccounting Advisor). With the potential dual benefits of cost savings and expanded higher margin services, we expect that CPA firms will increasingly outsource compliance tax services.

The authors note that “a staff accountant earning an annual salary of $45,000 (plus 20% of salary in benefits) costs a firm about $39 per billable hour, assuming 1,400 billable hours per year” whereas outsourcing through a facilitator “can be expected to result in tax preparation costs of about $20 per billable hour.” (Please note the “20% of salary in benefits” part of that equation.)

While the authors point out the reasons for the trend and the different concerns which abound in this practice, the paper doesn’t go into how clients are faring with this process. Judging from my own frustrating experiences recently in dealing with the overseas call center of a major software company, I have serious doubts about whether this trend will, in the end, be very good for clients. (See previous post here on the topic of outsourcing of legal services.)

CPA Technology Advisor’s Article on Blogs

Dave McClure for The CPA Technology Advisor has written a great two-part article on blogs and their growing use as a communications tool for tax and accounting firms. Part I is here and Part II is here. Part II provides…

Dave McClure for The CPA Technology Advisor has written a great two-part article on blogs and their growing use as a communications tool for tax and accounting firms. Part I is here and Part II is here. Part II provides a very useful list of tax and accounting blogs (and mentions Benefitsblog).

Employee Election Rights

For those of you who might be interested in the topic, Professor Rafael Gely of the University of Cincinnati College of Law reports that "the majority of states have laws requiring companies to give employees time off to exercise their…

For those of you who might be interested in the topic, Professor Rafael Gely of the University of Cincinnati College of Law reports that “the majority of states have laws requiring companies to give employees time off to exercise their right to vote.” He provides a list of links to state laws requiring companies to provide time off to employees to vote, or which provide for other types of protections for employees participating in elections. Professor Gely just recently started the LaborProf Blog as part of the Law Professor Blogs Network.

Finding the Place to Vote

From Inter Alia: Hate having to search through the tiny listings in your local newspaper to find where your polling place is located? Try My Polling Place. Just enter your street address and zip code, and get the name of…

From Inter Alia:

Hate having to search through the tiny listings in your local newspaper to find where your polling place is located? Try My Polling Place. Just enter your street address and zip code, and get the name of your polling place along with a map and links to driving directions.

By the way, one thing I look forward to every week is Inter Alia’s weekly newsletter called the “Internet Legal Research Weekly.” You can subscribe to it here if you like. It’s free and the archives are here.

Suppose an employer discovers that some of its employees are market-timing* in the employer's 401(k) plan and rightly decides that such practices are detrimental to the rest of the participants. Suppose the employer asks the employees to cease the market-timing…

Suppose an employer discovers that some of its employees are market-timing* in the employer’s 401(k) plan and rightly decides that such practices are detrimental to the rest of the participants. Suppose the employer asks the employees to cease the market-timing and all employees heed the request, except one. Could the employer terminate the rebellious employee who fails to comply with its request? Or how about just warning the employee that his employment and career at the company could be impacted if the employee doesn’t stop? Wouldn’t such action on its face appear necessary in light of recent mutual fund scandals? Does an employee have a right to engage in market-timing in a 401(k) plan?

A federal district court in Iowa grappled with these very issues in a fascinating case decided last year. The case was Borneman v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 291 F. Supp. 2d 935 (S.D. Iowa Nov. 25, 2003) [pdf (62 pages)]. According to the court in Borneman, if the plan document allows market-timing, i.e. does not contain any restrictions on market-timing, the employer could be held to violate section 510 of ERISA if it takes adverse action against an employee in order to hinder the employee from exercising his or her rights under the plan. In other words, the court reasoned that, if the plan document allows market-timing, the participant then would have a supposed right to engage in market-timing, and any adverse action taken against the employee to prevent his or her exercise of such right could violate Section 510 of ERISA. (That section provides that “It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan, this subchapter . . . or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan [or] this subchapter.”)

The court in Borneman stated:

An integral part of Plaintiff’s § 1140 claim for retaliation is a showing that he exercised a right to which he was entitled under the terms of his employee benefit plan or under ERISA itself: There is no dispute in this case that throughout the time period relevant to this lawsuit, the market timing trading that Mr. Borneman was engaging in was permitted under the terms of his Plan. Mr. Borneman freely engaged in market timing trading until approximately June 14, 2001. Until that time, there had been no market timing trading restriction in place. Principal had requested that Plaintiff voluntarily limit his trading, but such request does not constitute a limitation under the Plan. Plaintiff’s trading to that point was a protected activity. After June 14, 2001, it is undisputed that Mr. Borneman did not trade in excess of the $30,000 limit imposed by Principal, which this Court has found that Principal had the right to impose. Thus, any trading after June 14, 2001 was a protected activity as well. Consequently, any retaliation by Principal on the basis of Plaintiff’s market timing trading throughout the duration of his employment would have been prohibited under § 1140. At all times, market timing trading in the amounts engaged in by Plaintiff was a right to which he was entitled under his employee benefit plan.

The court went on the analyze the different actions taken by the employer, and determined whether or not they were actions which could constitute “adverse employment actions” interfering with plaintiff’s right to engage in market-timing under ERISA. The court made the following interesting determinations:

(1) Amazingly, terminating the employee did not interfere with his right to engage in market-timing, said the court, since the “[p]aintiff retained his employee benefit plan after termination” and would have been “able to continue market timing trading even after his employment was terminated.”

(2) However, the court held that the adverse performance reviews and even “threats” about the employee’s future at the company could interfere with the employee’s exercise of his “right” of market-timing and section 510 claims should be allowed to survive a Motion for Summary Judgment on those issues:

Although these threats do not immediately affect the terms and conditions of a claimant’s employment, they do materially affect whether or not such employee can freely exercise his ERISA rights. By prohibiting retaliation and interference, § 1140 creates a seamless web of protection for participants and beneficiaries. Participants and beneficiaries are protected from attempts to discourage them from exercising rights under ERISA or their employee benefit plans, and they are protected if exercise of these rights actually results in an adverse employment action. If interference did not encompass protection against threats of discrimination, employers would be free to threaten employees with severe adverse employment actions, including termination, for exercising their rights.

While many plan documents now contain such market-timing restrictions or give discretion to impose market-timing restrictions, many still do not address the issue. Putting the restrictions in the plan document may protect the employer from liability under section 510 of ERISA. In addition, the DOL has indicated (in guidance issued last February on the subject of fiduciary response to the mutual fund scandals) that plan documentation is important with respect to the market-timing issue:

The imposition of trading restrictions that are not contemplated under the terms of the plan raises issues concerning the application of section 404(c), as well as issues as to whether such restrictions constitute the imposition of a “blackout period” requiring advance notice to affected participants and beneficiaries.

*”Market-timing” is a trading strategy that involves frequent purchases and sales of securities (with the securities being held for short periods) in an effort to anticipate changes in market prices.

Health Law Blogs

Over in the sidebar on the right, I added a section of links to blogs relating to health law and HIPAA:CamLaw (Complementary & Alternative Medicine)Health Care Law BlogHealthLawBlogHIPAA BlogHolland & Hart Health Care Law Blog…

Over in the sidebar on the right, I added a section of links to blogs relating to health law and HIPAA: